Zoom Out · October 2026 · 7 min read

Investment Readiness in MENA: Ready for Whom?

Investment readiness is usually treated as something a founder has. In MENA, it behaves more like something a market has, and the market keeps changing.

Across three consecutive USAID programs, I supervised and provided technical assistance to incubators and accelerators, and mentored the founders they supported. One phrase appeared in almost every work plan, results framework and cohort report: investment readiness.

What “Investment Ready” Meant in Practice

Before the pandemic, it mostly meant training: a pitch deck, a financial model, a mock investor panel and a demo day. Founders left ready to pitch. Far fewer were ready to be funded, and the gap was rarely in the deck.

The literature explains why programs were built that way. Colin Mason and Jennifer Kwok’s 2010 review of UK investment readiness programs framed the problem as demand-side: most businesses are not investment ready, owners often do not know what investors look for, and that weakens supply-side measures such as angel networks and public venture funds. Fix the founder, and the money will follow.

The evidence on that promise is mixed. In a World Bank randomized experiment with 346 innovative firms in Croatia, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, Ana Paula Cusolito, Ernest Dautovic and David McKenzie found that a readiness program raised firms’ readiness scores by about 0.3 standard deviations, as judged by independent experts. Over the following two years, treated firms were 5 percentage points more likely to close a deal with an outside investor, a difference that was not statistically significant. The World Bank’s own policy brief drew the lesson plainly: for many applicants, readiness may not be the main constraint.

Accelerator evidence points the same way. Ten years of data from the Global Accelerator Learning Initiative show that accelerated ventures raise more capital than those turned away, but the investment gain sits mainly in high-income countries. In low- and middle-income markets, the clearer gain is revenue growth, and traditional demo days are unlikely to produce funding where early-stage capital is scarce. None of this evidence comes from MENA trials, which is itself a gap.

“Investment ready” has become the new “graduated”: a status a program can award, count and report, whether or not anyone invests.

Then the Money Moved

The pandemic years changed the picture. MAGNiTT’s data shows venture funding into MENA startups at about $1 billion in 2020, then more than doubling in 2021 and rising again in 2022. For a while, a polished deck could find a conversation.

Then the cycle turned. Funding fell 23 percent in 2023 and a further 29 percent in 2024, to $1.9 billion as first reported, even as the number of deals rose 7 percent to 571 and nearly half of all deals sat in the $1 million to $5 million range. In 2025, MAGNiTT recorded a new high of $3.8 billion, driven by late-stage rounds and concentrated in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The first half of 2026 fell back by 22 percent, with 41 percent fewer deals, and the UAE alone took two-thirds of the money.

Through all of it, many of the same founders moved in and out of being “ready.” Nothing in their decks changed. The system around them did.

A Predictably Unpredictable Region

MENA adds its own layer. Shocks here are predictably unpredictable. Egypt devalued its pound in March 2022, again in January 2023, and floated it in March 2024, when it lost more than a third of its value in a day. Between early 2022 and March 2024, a dollar went from about 15.7 pounds to over 50, so the same pound revenue lost roughly two-thirds of its dollar value. Wamda’s data shows Egyptian startup funding peaking at $736 million in 2022 and falling to $334 million in 2024. As one investor told AGBI, “every dollar you invested three years ago is worth 30 cents now.”

In Lebanon, the World Bank ranked the crisis that began in 2019 as likely among the ten, possibly the three, most severe crises worldwide since the mid-nineteenth century. Startups lost access to their deposits, the central bank scheme that had financed the ecosystem was suspended, and about half of the startups in one survey moved all or part of their operations abroad, mostly to UAE free zones.

None of this surprises anyone who works here. It is the operating context. Yet much of the readiness curriculum used here was built for markets where the currency, the courts and the exit routes can be taken for granted. A founder can be ready for one year’s market and stranded by the next.

Zoom Out and the Picture Changes

Event: a well-trained founder pitches and does not close a round.
Pattern: readiness rises and falls with the funding cycle, not with the founder.
Structure: programs fund the founder’s side of the deal and rarely touch the investor’s side: ticket sizes, legal structures, exit routes and currency risk.
Mental model: readiness is something a founder has, not something a market has.

Programs stay at the event because the founder is the participant, the indicator and the contract. The investor’s side of the table has no owner in the design.

Investment Readiness Is a Match

Readiness is a match between a founder, an investor, a set of terms and a context, and any one of the four can fail. The investor side has its own gaps. The Collaborative for Frontier Finance describes a “missing middle” of businesses needing between $20,000 and $2 million, too large for microfinance and too small or risky for banks and venture funds. IFC’s 2017 estimate puts the MSME finance gap in MENA at 26 percent of GDP, the highest of any region. Exits are thin too: Wamda counted 57 startup acquisitions across the region in 2022 and described exit activity as still largely subdued. Accelerator data adds a gender layer: founding teams with women attract less equity investment, even when their revenues are higher.

As I wrote about youth enterprise funds, the criterion that decides is the one that counts, not the one written first. Here are five questions I ask before any cohort is called investment ready:

  1. Is there an investor for this ticket size, in this sector, between the last grant and the first venture round?
  2. Can the company structure let an investor in, and out, under local company law?
  3. Can due diligence work on the books these founders actually keep?
  4. Does the business model survive a currency shock, a rate change or a supply disruption?
  5. Has anyone exited a deal in this sector and market recently, and if not, what is an investor actually buying?

If the answers are no, the leverage point, in Donella Meadows’ sense, is not another pitch training. It sits on the other side of the table: finance for the ticket sizes few investors serve, legal structures investors trust, instruments that fit local cash flows, and the local investors who will still be there when the program ends.

A founder can be ready for an investor who does not exist, or for a market that changed last quarter. The systemic question is not how ready the founders are. It is: ready for whom, on what terms, and for which version of the region?

Work With Me on This

I help donors, fund managers and enterprise-support organizations design investment readiness and access-to-finance programs that work on both sides of the deal.

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Sources

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Organizations I Have Worked With
USAIDGlobal Affairs CanadaWorld BankCentral Bank of EgyptCommercial International BankIFCKfWEuropean UnionHabitat for Humanity InternationalAga Khan Agency for MicrofinanceDrosos FoundationUN WomenUN-HabitatLFS AdvisoryGoss GilroyEnvironment and Development GroupAECOMFINBI